EventPeeker

Failed Logon Spike — Brute Force and Password Spray

A failed logon spike is a large volume of authentication failures in a short window — the fingerprint of a brute-force or password spray attack. Windows logs Event ID 4625 for every failed NTLM authentication and 4771 for Kerberos failures. When lockouts trigger, Event ID 4740 confirms the attack has crossed your policy threshold.

Severity

High

ATT&CK Tactic

Credential Access

Common attacker usage

Ransomware initial access · Business email compromise · Credential stuffing tools (Hydra, Medusa, Spray) · Nation-state actors

Investigate immediately if

  • !A 4624 successful logon appears for the same account after 10+ failures
  • !Multiple admin or service accounts are locking out simultaneously
  • !The source IP is external and targeting internet-facing systems (VPN, OWA, RDP)
  • !Failures target the built-in Administrator account

MITRE ATT&CK

Technique

T1110 · Brute Force

Tactic

Credential Access

View on attack.mitre.org →

Security Relevance

Credential attacks are the most common initial access technique across ransomware, business email compromise, and nation-state intrusions. Automated tools can attempt thousands of passwords per minute. Password spraying — trying one common password against many accounts — is especially dangerous because it stays below lockout thresholds while still being highly effective. A single successful authentication after a failure spike means the attack worked and the environment is actively compromised.

Indicators of Malicious Use

  • 20+ Event ID 4625 failures within 5 minutes from a single source IP — automated brute-force threshold.
  • Failures against the same account from many different source IPs — distributed credential stuffing using leaked password lists.
  • Failures against many different accounts from one source IP — password spray pattern (one password tried across all accounts).
  • Sub Status 0xC000006A (wrong password) in bulk — confirms credential guessing, not user error.
  • Sub Status 0xC0000064 (user doesn't exist) — attacker is probing for valid usernames before guessing passwords.
  • Event ID 4740 (account lockout) for multiple accounts within minutes — confirms spray attack crossed your lockout threshold.
  • Event ID 4624 (successful logon) immediately following a failure spike for the same account — the attack succeeded.
  • Failures targeting Administrator, Domain Admin, or service accounts — highest-value targets for credential attacks.

Example Log Entry

Log Name: Security
Source:    Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing
Event ID:  4625
Level:     Information

An account failed to log on.

Account For Which Logon Failed:
  Account Name:  Administrator
  Account Domain: CORP

Failure Information:
  Failure Reason: Unknown user name or bad password.
  Status:         0xC000006D
  Sub Status:     0xC000006A

Network Information:
  Workstation Name: ATTACKER-PC
  Source IP Address: 185.220.101.47

[Repeated 143 times from same IP within 4 minutes]

Log Name: Security
Event ID:  4740

A user account was locked out.

Account That Was Locked Out:
  Account Name:     Administrator

Additional Information:
  Caller Computer Name: ATTACKER-PC

Investigation Steps

  1. 1.Identify the pattern first — count failures per source IP and per target account. Brute force is many failures against one account; spray is many accounts from one IP.
  2. 2.Check Sub Status codes: 0xC000006A = wrong password (guessing), 0xC0000064 = unknown username (probing), 0xC0000234 = account already locked.
  3. 3.Check Caller Computer Name in 4740 events — this field identifies the machine generating the bad passwords, which may be a compromised internal host or an external attacker.
  4. 4.Look for Event ID 4624 (successful logon) for any of the targeted accounts after the failure spike — this is the highest priority finding. A success means the attack worked.
  5. 5.For internet-facing systems (VPN, RDP, OWA), check whether the source IP is external — block it at the firewall immediately and check threat intelligence feeds for reputation.
  6. 6.For internal source IPs, the originating machine may itself be compromised — investigate that machine for malware, credential-harvesting tools, or attacker tooling.
  7. 7.Check whether targeted service accounts have had recent password changes — service accounts lock out when a service is still using an old password.

Check your own logs for this technique — upload an EVTX file for instant detection, no account required.

Common False Positives

  • User mistyping their password — a handful of failures (fewer than 5) for one account from their workstation, especially during morning hours, is almost certainly benign.
  • Cached credentials after a password change — Windows caches domain credentials. After a password change, a laptop that was offline will repeatedly fail with the old cached password until updated.
  • Service accounts with a stale password — a Windows service configured with a domain account password that was changed will generate continuous 4625 failures. Check Caller Computer Name and Services on that host.
  • Monitoring or vulnerability scanning tools — some authenticated scanners test credentials. Verify against your scheduled scan windows and scanner IP ranges.
  • MFA-protected systems during enrollment — some MFA systems generate temporary failures during token enrollment flows.

Remediation

  • Block the attacking IP at the firewall immediately if it is an external address generating hundreds of failures.
  • Enable account lockout policy if not already configured — recommended: lock after 10 failures, reset counter after 15 minutes, lockout duration 15 minutes.
  • Enforce MFA on all accounts exposed to network authentication — VPN, OWA, RDP, and admin portals are highest priority.
  • Disable or rename the built-in Administrator account — it is the most commonly targeted account in brute-force attacks.
  • For exposed RDP: restrict to VPN-only or use RD Gateway. Never expose RDP port 3389 directly to the internet.
  • Implement a SIEM alert: 10+ failures within 5 minutes from a single source, or 5+ different accounts failing from the same IP within 10 minutes.
  • Rotate credentials for any account that received failures, especially if a subsequent successful logon was observed.

Related Event IDs

4625Failed logon — the core failure event
4740Account lockout — confirms attack crossed threshold
4771Kerberos pre-auth failed — Kerberos equivalent of 4625
4624Successful logon — check for success after failure spike
4648Explicit credential logon — may follow successful credential theft

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