Windows Event ID 4769 — Kerberos Service Ticket Requested
Logged on the domain controller each time a client requests a Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) to access a specific service. Every Kerberos-authenticated connection to a file share, SQL server, web app, or other domain resource generates a 4769. Volume is high in healthy environments — the security signal comes from the encryption type, the requesting account pattern, and the services being targeted.
MITRE ATT&CK
T1558.003 · Kerberoasting
Credential Access
Why It Matters
4769 is the primary detection surface for two major credential attacks. Kerberoasting: an attacker with any domain account requests service tickets for accounts with SPNs, then cracks the RC4-encrypted ticket offline. Golden Ticket: a forged TGT (created using the krbtgt hash) is used to request service tickets — the giveaway is RC4 encryption or a non-existent Account Name in the 4769 event. Both attacks generate 4769 events that look nearly identical to legitimate traffic at the protocol level, making field-level analysis essential.
Key Fields
Investigation Tips
- 1.Kerberoasting pattern: single Account Name requesting TGS tickets for 5+ different SPNs within minutes, all with Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 (RC4).
- 2.Golden Ticket pattern: Account Name does not exist in Active Directory, OR no preceding Event 4768 (TGT request) on the DC for the same account — Golden Tickets bypass TGT issuance.
- 3.Filter for non-machine-account service names (SPNs without the $ suffix) — user and service accounts with SPNs are the Kerberoasting targets.
- 4.Legitimate app servers (SharePoint, SQL, IIS) request TGS for many services — baseline normal patterns per server before alerting on volume.
- 5.Check Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 on privileged accounts (Domain Admins, krbtgt) specifically — these should use AES256 in modern domains.
Detection Logic
Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) — detect Kerberoasting via RC4 service ticket requests, and volume-based spray (one account requesting 5+ tickets in 5 min).
// Kerberoasting: RC4 service ticket requests targeting SPN accounts
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4769
| where TicketEncryptionType == "0x17"
| where ServiceName !endswith "$"
| where ServiceName != "krbtgt"
| project TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, ServiceName, IpAddress, Computer
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
// Volume-based Kerberoasting: one account requesting 5+ RC4 tickets within 5 min
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4769
| where TicketEncryptionType == "0x17"
| summarize TicketCount=count(), Services=make_set(ServiceName)
by TargetAccount, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where TicketCount >= 5
| sort by TimeGenerated descSeeing Event ID 4769 in your own logs? Upload an .evtx file — EventPeeker flags kerberos service ticket requested automatically, maps it to MITRE ATT&CK, and writes the triage report. No account, files auto-deleted.
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Go deeper: the full Kerberos Attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting) guide
Builds on this page with the attack chain, step-by-step investigation, immediate containment actions, KQL/Sigma detection queries, and an annotated example log.
Read the Kerberos Attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting) guide →See Event ID 4769 in your logs
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